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Abstract 
The very title of this talk makes a suggestion which must be forestalled, name­
ly the idea that laboratory and food animals enjoy some exceptional moral status 
by virtue of the fact that we use them. In fact, it is extremely difficult to find any 
morally relevant grounds for distinguishing between food and laboratory animals 
and other animals and, far more dramatically, between animals and humans. The 
same conditions which require that we apply moral categories to humans rational­
ly require that we apply them to animals as well. While it is obviously pragmatical­
ly impossible in our current sociocultural setting to expect that animals should be 
so treated, this idea should be kept before us as a moral ideal toward which to 
strive. In this vein, it seems morally necessary that the use of animals in research be 
constrained by two principles, which ought to be codified as law: the utilitarian
principle and the rights principle. It might be thought that such constraints would 
serve as an intolerable burden to researchers, but such a worry is primarily based 
upon a faulty understanding of the nature of science which can be refuted by an 
examination of the history of science. 
Imagine going to a conference on human pain and suffering and finding a 
session entitled: "Moral ity: Definition of the Term in Relation to Negroes." This 
would not perhaps have sounded odd 1 25 years ago when it was widely taken for 
granted that blacks were a lower form of l ife. But today, it would jar and repel us, 
because it impl ies that whatever moral categories we have for people in general 
do not apply to black people. 
Simi larly, it is clear that the title of this session does not jar most of us. 
Morally, most of us today are, relative to animals, in the position of most people 
of years ago relative to the Negro. Let us recall the famous Dred Scott case of 
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1 856, in which the Supreme Court denied citizenship to blacks on the grounds 
that they were "a subordi nate and inferior class of beings, who had been subju­
gated by the dominant race." The court reflected a widespread view. We owned 
Negroes, we bred them, raised them, took care of them; therefore they were ours, 
they were property, to do with as we saw fit. 
A s imi lar view is held by most of us with regard to animals in general, but 
most strongl y  with regard to laboratory and food animals, as the title of this ad­
dress i mplies. The view is this: These animals have, after a l l ,  been brought into ex­
istence by us, their very existence depends on us. We have shaped their bodies 
and behavior genetically. We give them life and determine the course of their 
lives. They would have no lives at all were it not for us. Their raison d'etre, their 
very nature, is to serve us. Surely then, we can treat them as we see fit. 
Impl icit in this way of seeing things are a number of interesting points. One 
is an assumption that any l ife is better than none, and that those who give 
life - the ult imate gift - to something may dispose of it as they see fit. Second is 
a d istorted awareness that animals have natures; the natures of food and labora­
tory animals being to serve as means to human ends, as tools  for humans, as "ani­
mal models," etc. Often, those natures have been developed and shaped by us. 
These assumptions must be looked at quite carefully, for impl icit in them 
are a number of profound issues which need much unpacking, if we are to answer 
the question posed. Let us consider the idea that being responsible for the life of 
something gives one absolute right over that being. ( I nterestingly enough, the an­
cient idea was just the opposite- if a person saved another's l ife, he or she was 
responsible for taking care of that l ife forever.) Suppose I d iscover a woman who 
is  about to have an abortion. I pay her a large sum of money to have the ch i ld  and 
turn it over to me. I raise the child, house it, feed it, cap its teeth, educate it. 
When it turns 1 6, I decide that I am going to cook and eat it, or use it to study the 
long term effects of asbestos on the l ungs. After al l ,  without me it would have 
had no I ife at al I !  
Or consider another scenario. After I buy the chi ld, having decided to  eat it, 
or use it for research, I care for it exclusively accord i ng to economic consider­
ations, taking no account of its human nature except to keep it alive and 
reasonably· healthy. 
We obviously would not accept this approach to human beings. ( I n  fact, we 
are d i rectly responsible both for the existence and the traits of our chi ldren, yet 
we do not feel we can d ispose of them as we see fit.) We do not accept such an 
approach regarding blacks even though we bred them for servitude for genera­
tions. Why, then, do we accept it vis a vis animals? The obvious answer is, "There 
is a difference between people and animals ." But the key question then becomes, 
"What is this difference, and why does it l i cense different treatment?" Obviously, 
it is not enough to duck the issues by saying it is illegal to treat people that way. 
The reason that it is i l legal i s  that we consider it absolutely wrong morally. 
There are many differences between humans and other animals which are 
qu ite obvious. H umans are the only creatures that play golf, fry their food, wear 
lipstick, etc. Clearly,these differences do not seem to have any moral relevance. 
What does this mean? Let me i l l ustrate: Suppose I walk up  to you throughout my 
talk and punch you periodically. You ask me why. I say, "Because you have curly 
hair, that's why. It's okay to hit people with curly hair." Obviously, this is  unac-
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ceptable. Clearly, cur l iness is  not a morally relevant reason for striking someone. 
We don't excuse my hitting you because you are the only person with curly hair. 
On the other hand, if I hit you because I saw you molesting a chi ld between ses­
sions, that does seem to be morally relevant, i.e., to be a difference that makes a 
moral difference. 
Most of the obvious differences between humans and other animals do not 
meet the test of moral relevance for justifying our differences i n  treatment of ani­
mals . Is it any more justifiable to subject a being to pain because it has fur than 
to subject a person to pain because he or she has curly hair? I s  it justifiable 
because we are more powerful than animals? Then it must be permissible to tor­
ture chi ldren. I s  it because animals are Jess intell igent than we are? Then moral ity 
ought to vary with I .Q. Few of us would accept the logical conclusion of this posi­
tion, namely that if some extra-terrestrial creatures were as superior to us in­
tellectually as we are to rats, then they would be perfectly entitled to exploit us 
as they saw fit. 
As I have argued in a number of articles, papers, books, lectures, etc., I do 
not think that there are any morally relevant differences which l icense us to ex­
cl ude animals i n  general from moral consideration in what we do whi le we in­
clude people. Furthermore, it does not seem to me that there are any morally rel­
evant differences between food and l aboratory animals and other animals, any 
more than there are morally relevant differences between slaves and other 
humans. This sounds very radical because we do not l ive that way. But as Plato 
long ago pointed out, just because we all do something does not make it right. 
Human beings have developed their moral ideas on the basis of an aware­
ness that certain things are harmful to other human beings while others are 
helpful and desirable. We have further realized that certain things are more 
crucial to human beings than others are. Obviously those needs related to su rviv­
al are essential, as are those related to avoidance of pain. But just as significant 
are those needs and pursuits which grow out of our uniquely human natures -
the abil ity to speak and reason. It is for this reason that we constitutionally pro­
tect freedom of speech and of thought and of assembly and of religion, because 
it is felt that i n  these pursu its lies what is essential to being human. We are incon­
s istent, however, when we fail to apply the same categories and notion to ani­
mals. Vertebrate animals feel pain, whatever some scientists may suggest. If 
these scientists really believe that animals do not feel pain, why do they do pain 
and analgesic research on animals? Even fish must suffer, since they can be trained 
using negative reinforcement, though textbooks in wi ldl ife biology do not con­
sider that fish feel pain. A l l  behavioral, neurophysiological and evolutionary evi­
dence mi l itates i n  favor of this conclusion. Animals have basic needs. And most 
im portant for our  purposes, animals have natures, have a telos, to use Aristotle's 
phrase, in just the same way that humans do. 
This brings me back to the point made earlier, our hidden assumption that 
the nature of laboratory and food animals is to be used by man, since we created 
them. This is clearly absurd, as I suggested earlier. One can indeed imagine 
creating chickens who happily pluck, dismember and fry themselves, or rats who 
are happiest in tiny cages. (But can one imagine developing animals who enjoy 
the pain of psychological experiments - masochistic mice? If there were such 
creatures, they could not be used for negative reinforcement studies!) But the 
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animals that we do use for food production and research pu rposes do feel pain, 
do suffer, and do have natures which are almost invariably thwarted and 
frustrated by our uses. Behavioral studies indicate, for example, that all sorts of 
animals prefer open space to confinement. And, as indicated, if rats did not suf­
fer pain, stress, and anxiety, they would not be used by psychologists and pain 
researchers. Despite the fact, then, that we have indeed brought these animals 
into being, they do have natures of their own, with genetically determ ined 
physical and behavioral aspects which we are morally obliged to respect, and 
which we usual ly fail to respect when we use these animals . It is the biologist's, 
ecologist's and ethologist's job to tell us what the nature of a given animal is, so 
that we may know where our obligations l ie. 
It may perhaps follow logically from what I have been saying that it is  wrong 
to ever use animals for research or to ever raise animal s  for food if it is wrong to · 
so use people. (Some phi losophers have taken this tack.) I am not interested in 
pushing this conclusion, because it has no contact with reality. At best, l ike the 
idea of turning the other cheek, it is an ideal against which to measure our actual 
activities rather than a possible program to follow. Note, too, that what we are 
wi l l ing to call "suffering," or "morally relevant suffering," depends on our 
values; this is true regarding both people and animals. It does, however, seem to 
me inescapable that one shou ld draw certain conclusions concerning the use of 
animals in  research and food production. (I shall concentrate on research, 
because I am more fami l iar with the problems there.) I t  seems to me morally 
necessary that the use of animals in research ideally be constrained by two prin­
ciples, which ought to be codified as law: 
1) The Utilitarian Principle- It is usual ly argued that animal suffering
is justified in research on the grounds that research produces great
benefits to humans and animals. If this is the case, then we ought to
legitimately demand of al l  uses of animals i n  research that the benefits
(or likely benefits) to humans (or to humans and animals) clearly out­
weigh the pain and suffering experienced by the experimental animals.
I t  wil l not do to object to this on the grounds that we never know what
benefits wi l l  result from a piece of research. We make such predic­
tions about l ikely benefits every day in a l l  aspects of publ i c policy (in­
c lud ing the support of research). I n  any case, for the argument, let us
ignore questionable cases and concentrate only on clear-cut ones.
2) The Rights Principle - I n  cases where research is deemed justifia­
ble by the Util itarian Principle it should be conducted i n  such a way as
to maximize the animal's potential for living its life accordi ng to its
nature or telos, and certain rights should be protected regardless of con­
siderations of cost.
This means that we cannot do as we see fit to a research animal, even if we 
have determined that the animal's use is justified by the util itarian principle. We 
must avoid encroaching as far as possible (consonant with the experiment) on the 
animal's fundamental i nterests and nature, and this in turn means that the animal 
has a right to freedom from pain, to be housed and fed in accordance with its 
INT J STUD ANIM PROB 1(4) 1980 237 
B.E. Rollin-Concept of "Humane Treatment" Original Article 
nature, to exercise, companionship, play, etc.; in short, to be treated as we would 
treat human beings used for such purposes - as ends in  themselves, in Kant's 
phrase, not merely as means. Both of these principles must be incorporated into a 
meaningful federal Animal Welfare Act, which covers all animals in al l  categories 
(with no exclusion of mice, rats, and domestic animals), which provides meaning­
ful penalties for violation, and which requires that funding agencies apply these 
principles. Perhaps it should also require local peer review by large comm ittees 
of scientists and nonscientists, such as i s  done with al l  use of animals in research 
in Uppsala, Sweden. Some scientists w i l l  argue that there is no place in peer 
review for nonscientists -that only scientists can judge the work of other scien­
tists. This is clearly nonsense. The average scientist is a nonscientist outside of his 
or her own field. In my years in u niversity I have seen this demonstrated on count­
less occasions. People are wel l versed i n  their own niche and are tota l ly ignorant 
outside of it. The average biological scientist, for example, is totally incom petent 
to judge a research proposal i n  evolutionary theory, even though evolutionary 
theory is at the basis of all modern biology. 
Your initial reactions to my proposals are doubtless that they would repre­
sent an intolerable constraint on good science. I do not bel ieve this to be the 
case. I n  fact, they wou ld actually serve to promote better science. For one thing 
they would force much closer attention to be paid to experimental design and ex­
ecution. Sloppy research construction and execution results i n  wastage of funds, 
in  worthless results, and in  animal suffering (witness the recent National Cancer 
I nstitute scandals [See Science 204:1 287-1 292 and 205:746-748, 1 979-Ed.]). I'm 
sure all of you are fam i l iar with examples. One which epitomizes the problem for 
me occurred a few years ago. A researcher was interested i n  studying the effects 
of starvation on the rumen of mule  deer, so he proceeded systematically to 
starve a group of mule deer by withholding food on a regular basis. Like a good 
researcher, he had a control group of deer which he was feeding for comparison. 
The two groups were separated only by a wire mesh, so that the deer being starved 
were subjected to the exquis ite torture of watching and smel l ing the other deer 
being fed. Not only is this cruel, it is stupid, for the olfactory and visual stimul i  
could certainly skew the metabolisms of the starving deer, and leave significant 
changes in the rumen not to be found u nder natural conditions. 
I t  seems to me that the only sort of research projects dramatically affected 
by our principles would be those activities which are essentially tinkering - trial 
and error, devoid of a theoretical base, done by the sort of researchers who really 
have no idea of why they do what they do or even of what they are doing. Robert 
Paul Wolff once characterized such researchers as people who throw pieces of 
dung into a dung heap and ful ly believe that eventually there wi l l  stand a 
cathedral. The most salient examples of this, of course, arise in the field of behav­
ioral psychology. One of my colleagues i n  psychology was recently asked why he 
continues to do underwater maze trials on rats - of what possible value or inter­
est is the resulting knowledge? "This is for future generations to decide," he 
replied. Period. 
Virtually the whole field of behavioral psychology is open to the sort of crit­
icism we are advancing, and it is correlatively no accident that far and away the 
worst atrocities upon animals occur in this field. As my col league Richard Kit­
chener has ably demonstrated, Skinnerian behavioral psychology is atheoretical, 
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devoid of a conceptual base. I t  is characterized by a totally empirical, "Let's see 
what happens if. . ." approach to science. Hence the persistence of "experiments" 
l i ke the b l inding of hamsters to see if territorial aggression is increased, the study
of the effect of footshock i n  rabbits on brain responses to tone stimul i ,  the inau­
guration of "learned helplessness" in  dogs, etc.
Many lay-people bel ieve that science is simply experimentation - that " Let's 
see what happens" is the essence of science. But al l  good scientists real ize that 
this is not the case. Science is thought and imagination, insight tested by experi­
ment, not arising out of b l i nd induction. Scientific theories do not emerge from 
random data collection. The im portance of data is in the verification of hypoth­
eses, not in their discovery. After al l ,  when one considers any major scientific 
theory, be it the theory of gravitation, relativity, quantum mechanics, the gene, 
etc., one makes reference to entities and processes which are unobservable and 
whose d iscovery requ i red imaginative leaps. Newton was certainly not the fi rst 
man to be hit by a fal l ing apple, yet it took Newton's theoretical vision to postu­
late gravitation. 
The most superficial look at the history of science reveals that no major ad­
vances were made simply by gathering data. The great sc ientists were gu ided by 
theory and vision, indeed, sometimes by erroneous vision, as in the case of 
Kepler, who sought to prove that the orbits of the planets could be related mathe­
matically as the notes of the musical scale, thereby establ ishing the mus ic  of the 
spheres postul ated by the Pythagoreans. Or let us recall Gal i leo, who is often said 
to have shown that the acceleration of fall ing bodies is  independent of their mass 
and is uniform by dropping a heavy and a light object from the Leaning Tower of 
Pisa. I n  fact, as seen in his Dialogues Concerning the T wo Great Systems of the 
World, Gal i leo was a good deal more ingenious than that, and employed reason 
to estab l ish this point. Take two five-pound weights, said Gal i leo, and drop them 
from the same height. Surely they wi l l  hit the ground at the same time. J o i n  them 
by a weightless rod - surely they wi l l  sti l l  hit the ground at the same time when 
dropped. Shrink the rod until the two weights are stuck together. Surely they wi l l  
sti l l  hit the ground at the same time. But  now we have a ten pound weight, show­
ing that rate of fal l is independent of mass. 
As another example of where theory precedes data and predominates over 
it, consider Einstein. His world-shattering critique of Newton was not based on 
data or experiments unavailable to others, but rather on a conceptual analysis of 
the concept of s imultaneity. Correlatively, when asked what he would have said 
if some astronomical predictions generated by the general theory of relativity 
had not been supported by the data gathered by Eddington, E instein said, in es­
sence, "So much the worse for the data - the theory is correct!" 
A s imi lar account can be given about the father of genetics, Gregor Mendel. 
Every schoolchild knows of Mendel's famous experiments with the pea plants, 
which allegedly led him to the discovery of genetics. I n  fact, statistical analysis 
of Mendel's studies ind icate that the probabil ity of Mendel actually obtaining 
the experimental results he claimed was only .00007, or one in 14,000! I n  short, 
Mendel knew that the theory was correct, and chose the data which met his ex­
pectations. 
We know too from the h istory of science, that in the face of theoretical com­
mitment, recalc itrant data is easily d ismissed or explained away and that theory 
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determ ines what we see. Consider Gal i leo's bishops, who refused to look through 
the telescope, because they knew the moon was perfect. Suppose they would 
have been forced to look -would they then have been forced to adm it that it 
was not perfect? Not at al l  - they s imply would have said that Gal i leo had 
created an instrument which made the perfect moon look flawed! An even more 
dramatic example is told of Franz Anton Mesmer, the discoverer of "animal 
magnetism," or hypnotism. In order to i l lustrate the anaesthetic effects of hypno­
tism to skeptical physicians, Mesmer hypnotized a patient who was to undergo 
amputation, and the l imb was removed with no visible discomfort. "Have I not 
proved my point?" asked Mesmer triumphantly. "Not at al l ," replied the 
physicans. "The man felt pain; he just failed to show it." 
The point then, is this: Contrary to the way science is often taught and con­
trary to the way many researchers proceed, science is not merely fact-gathering. 
To paraphrase the great phi losopher, Imm anuel Kant, "Theories without data are 
em pty, data without theories are bl ind." Certainly we shall make no progress 
without accumulating data and facts. But these facts must not be gathered at 
random. They must be gathered in order to test hypotheses and theories arrived 
at via the creative power of thought, reason and imagination. 
The point I am stressing relative to animal research is this: Research which 
proceeds simply by trial and error is l i kely to be both useless and cruel. In this 
sense, placing high value and emphasis on animal l ife and suffering and putting a 
certain burden of proof as to the uti l ity and soundness of a piece of research is 
certain to force us to look more carefu l ly  at the logic of the research that we do 
or contemplate doing, and thus el im inate mere tinkering with no conceptual 
basis. I n  the final analysis, animals are not models for anything, except from the 
perspective of the theoretical m i nd, which carefu l ly constructs hypotheses and 
justifies each use of an animal conceptually and morally. Models, l ike maps, do 
not exist in nature. Maps are the product of thought and artifice, so too are 
models. To speak of animal models is to speak of animals being used as models i n  
accordance with a ful l  set of hypotheses which give us reason to believe that the 
animal does serve to model something, and something worth knowing. Too often, 
talk of animal models entails that the animal is by nature a model, something 
simply there for us to tinker with. When the psychologists, for example, cannot 
answer the following dilemma, they demonstrate that they have no conceptual 
let alone moral right to use animals as "models": "A good deal of your research is 
on m ice and rats, studying behavior and learning, util izing pain to condition the 
animals. Clearly, you are not i nterested in the m i nd of the rat for its own sake. 
You study these animals because they are relevantly analogous to human beings, 
because rat behavior is a good model for human behavior. The di lemma is this: 
Either the rats are relevantly analogous to human beings in terms of their abil ity 
to learn by positive and negative reinforcement ( i .e . ,  pleasure and pain) in which 
case it is  d ifficult to see what right you have to do things to rats which you would 
not do to human beings, or the rats are not relevantly analogous to human beings 
in these morally relevant ways, in which case it is difficult to see the value in 
studying them." 
I conclude then, by answering the question I began by attacking. What is 
humane treatment of food and laboratory animals? Fi rst and foremost, it is recog­
nizing their moral status, seeing that they are objects of moral concern and treat-
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ing them as you would wish to be treated were you the "model" for some supe­
rior race which can d ispose of humans as it sees fit. Equal ly important, we m ust 
study the nature of the animals we use for food and research i n  physiological and 
ethological terms to determine what needs they have, and how to meet them. 
Certain ly  we have bred food animals for food, and lab animals for research, but 
we have not bred out their abil ity to feel pain, to suffer under crowding condi­
tions, to enjoy a l ife without constant stress, etc. If we do not choose to meet 
these needs, we are morally bounlrl to develop animals which do not have them. 
Inc identally, I might add that if everything I have been saying is true, there is 
another problem with the title of this talk, namely the use of the phrase "hum ane" 
treatment. "H umane" is a patron izing term; it impl ies to most people kindness 
which we can withhold or give freely ( l ike "charity"). In phi losophers' jargon, it is 
an activity of benevolence, not of duty. But if animals do have genuine moral 
status, then we are morally obliged to treat them as moral objects; it is not s imply 
a m atter of choice and generosity on our part. True, we may choose not to do so 
since i n  our society we can get away with it, but then we are in the moral position 
of a person who chooses to do harm to other people when he is certain that he 
can "get away with it." We must cease to think (and talk) of our proper treatment 
of animals as a favor we do them, and start to think of it instead as something we 
owe them, as something to which they have a right and claim. 
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